Shortlist 2016 Bernard Brodie Prize

Bernard Brodie lecturing, by Walter Sanders for Life Magazine, September 1946
Bernard Brodie lecturing, by Walter Sanders for Life Magazine, September 1946

Contemporary Security Policy awards the Bernard Brodie Prize annually to the author of an outstanding article published in the journal the previous year.

The award is named for Dr. Bernard Brodie (1918-1978), author of The Absolute Weapon (1946), Strategy in the Missile Age (1958) and War and Strategy (1973), establishing ideas that remain at the centre of security debates to this day. One of the first analysts to cross between official and academic environments, he pioneered the model of civilian influence that CSP represents.

It is with great pleasure to announce the shortlist of the 2016 Bernard Brodie Prize:

  • Seth Baum (2015) ‘Winter-safe Deterrence: The Risk of Nuclear Winter and Its Challenge to Deterrence’, Contemporary Security Policy 36(1): 123-148.
  • Richard Bitzinger (2015) ‘Defense Industries in Asia and the Technonationalist Impulse’, Contemporary Security Policy 36(3): 453-472.
  • John Mitton (2015) ‘Selling Schelling Short: Reputations and American Coercive Diplomacy after Syria’, Contemporary Security Policy 36(3): 408-431.
  • Niklas Nováky (2015) ‘Why so Soft? The European Union in Ukraine’, Contemporary Security Policy 36(2): 244-266.
  • Patricia Shamai (2015) ‘Name and Shame: Unravelling the Stigmatization of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Contemporary Security Policy 36(1): 104-122.

The shortlist has been put together by outgoing editors Aaron Karp and Regina Karp and the new editor Hylke Dijkstra. The Bernard Brodie Prize will be awarded by a jury from the CSP editorial board. All the articles on the shortlist for the 2016 Bernard Brodie Prize are freely available here.

Prepare for the Coming Multi-Order World

CSP_Blog_16_02_FlockhartThe international system is changing on a scale that is bigger than the end of the Cold War.

The international system is changing, while our institutions seem to be challenged by a long succession of crises. Policy makers have expressed the feelings that ‘the world is spinning out of control’ and that ‘order is collapsing’ and that we appear to be returning to a multipolar system.

A return to a multipolar system is, however, an overly simplistic reading of the current situation. Rather what appears on the horizon is a completely different international system, which is composed of different international orders rather than by different powerful sovereign states. The coming multi-order world will be characterized by very different dynamics and order-making practices. The current liberal order will continue to exist, but its global reach will be a thing of the past and it will be joined by other ‘orders’ based on different ideas and identities. Liberal order-making practices and values will no longer be universally shared.

The uncertainty about the apparent systemic change in the making is not surprising. Systemic change is a rare occurrence, which has only happened three times in the last 200 years – in 1815 after the Napoleonic wars, in the protracted and bloody process of collapsing order between 1914-1945 and finally in 1989 with the end of the Cold War. Moreover, systemic change is complex and likely to be a long process of subtle changes, whose significance may only be visible retrospectively. The question is therefore how we know if the international system is changing, and if it is changing, what kind of international system lies ahead?

Despite the rarity, complexity and subtlety of change in the international system, indicators of systemic change are all too apparent. They include shifting power, the appearance of new and re-emerging actors on the international scene, and challenges to established practices and ideas, all of which are expressed in the many ongoing crises facing decision-makers.

In addition, strategic foresight analyses point to changes in demographics, individual empowerment, technology and access to technology, resources, economics and the environment. These changes are likely to place increased demands on the institutional capacity and political structures of the current international order. Together these two forms of change add up to a murky picture of compounding complexity and add to the feelings of ‘collapsing order’.

To better understand the significance of the multi-order world, it is useful to compare this system with the three alternative arguments in the academic and policy literature on the kind of new international system in the making.

The first position is the most prevalent. Proponents argue that what lies ahead is a multipolar world in which several great powers will compete and use traditional balance of power politics to balance each other and to advance their own interests. It is anticipated that the international system will revert back to a past system of multipolarity much akin to what was in place during the 19th century. This position assumes continued primacy of the United States, although balancing may either be an active form primarily against China or it may be offshore with a retrenched America focusing on domestic American issues.

The second position is favored by liberal internationalists such as Hillary Clinton and John Ikenberry. Proponents argue that what lies ahead is a multi-partner world. This is essentially a continuation of the existing system in which the United States will attempt to maintain its leadership position. At the same time, it will enter into partnerships with new actors, which they assume can be coopted into a reformed version of the existing order. This position assumes a continued high level of American engagement in global affairs in partnership with allies and other stakeholders in the global order.

The third position emphasizes that the new international system will not only be characterized by a diffusion of power, but will also be characterized by diversity of ideas. The position argues that what lies ahead is a multi-culture world. The challenge will be to reach global consensus on collective security challenges whilst accepting diversity in domestic and regional affairs. The expectation is a new form of international system, which is de-centered and lacking any overall shared values and practices. The position of the United States will be to remain the leader of liberal states and to strengthen the core and the magnetism of the existing liberal order.

Although each of the three positions point to a plausible future, they do not fully capture what lies ahead. Rather, it is necessary to look more closely at the constituent elements of international orders and how the condition of order is constituted through different practices and resting on particular identities. By uncovering the different elements of international orders, it is possible to see how the three previous historical processes of systemic change have played out in very different ways on each occasion. Moreover, by focusing on the elements making up the current international order, it is revealed that the current changes taking place are deeper and perhaps more far-reaching than previous systemic change. The likely coming international system is a new form composed of several ‘international orders’ nested within an overall international system.

The challenge in a multi-order world will be to forge new forms of relationships between diverse actors. This requires convergence involving complex power relations, different partnerships and reformed institutions that are able to reach across dividing lines to forge cooperation between different cultures with different domestic governance structures. The coming multi-order world will be radically different and the changes that are currently taking place are every bit as far reaching as previous systemic changes. Given that it is likely to end 200 years of the expansion of the liberal order, the coming systemic change is likely to be experienced by the West as deeply unsettling.

Trine Flockhart is Professor of International Relations at the University of Kent in the United Kingdom. She is the author of “The Coming Multi-Order World”, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.37, No.1, 2016, pp.3-30. It is available via OpenAccess here.

Un(wo)manned Aerial Vehicles: How UAVs Influence Masculinity In The Conflict Arena

CSP_Blog_16_01_KunashakaranAs a result of the introduction of drones (or UAVs), there have been numerous studies on the moral and ethical uses of an asymmetrical warfare, a war where one side is vastly superior to the other. However, not much research has been done into the intrinsic effects of these technologies.

How do they affect soldiers? How do they transform the role of gender in the society? Are they really the “silver bullet” that policymakers have been looking for: a machine that keeps troops far away from the ugliness of war? Or do they in fact bring the conflict zone closer than ever before?

Albert Camus once said that “there are causes worth dying for, but none worth killing for”. With the technological advancements of drones and the continuous distancing of troops from the warzone, the question is not so much of what militaries would kill for, but rather how they could potentially suffer from the kill.

Talking about masculinity and militaries can get rather tense. And a full article on it seems to simply suck all the air out of the room. However, with the technological advancements that push soldiers further and further away from the battlezone, we need to give more thought to such abstract ideas.

The Evolution of Technology and The Role of Women

Today’s women are beginning to lead in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. In institutions that are considered “manly”, women are beginning to play a leading role. And with the introduction of technology, neither mere brute strength nor physical prowess are deciding factors of what makes an ideal combatant.

When studying the changing dynamics of a conflict zone, gender is increasingly a key consideration.CSP_Blog_16_01_Kunashakaran_wecandoit

With the increasing use of UAVs, and similar distancing technologies that seek to protect troops, it is also time we talked about how women play a role with the technologies that dominate the conflict arena.

Back in the 20th century, World War II had a strong influence on women and the workforce. During this period, fields that were usually reserved for men suddenly saw a previously untapped demographic. An example are the very iconic “Rosie The Riveter” posters. This thrust helped to change the futur
e of the world, and of women in the workforce.

More recently, the US Army has begun to open up previously “men-only” positions to women. But do current deeply-entrenched norms and values in a rather male-dominated society give way that easily? Does the continuous chase for the ultimate killing machine transform traditional masculinity?

The Latent Psychological Effects of Combatant Technology

When writing my article on the influence of UAVs on gender dynamics, it made me think of how we approach the very tricky subject of humanity. Studying the various effects that arise with the increasing distancing of the warzone, I observed that sometimes hardest part is to reconcile the conflict going on “within”.

A stark finding were the significant levels of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) that drone operators suffer from, even when far away from the warzone. This seems counter-intuitive to introducing a technology that “protects” combatants. It is precisely for this reasons that we need to further delve into these latent psychological effects.

PTSD seems to be caused by the incredibly complex juxtaposition of having to constantly switch between a combatant mind-set and then stepping out of the airbase to go home interacting with family or everyday society. This constant psychological switch takes a toll of previously unobserved magnitude on the individual.

Critical Policy Considerations for the Future

This is why, more so than soldiers on the ground, structural policies need to address a vast number of psychological, emotional and social factors. It also begs the question of when we are going to consider the aspect of human fallibility in the design of technologies?

Every day we hear more about robots and cyborgs taking over aspects of daily lives of humans. A rather (seemingly) un-gendered entity encroaches upon humanity and sufficient focus needs to be placed on policies that address this changing dimension. And in the fields of security and the military, advancements in technology keep the battlefield far away from home, with the ease of eliminating an individual resting on an operator’s fingertips.

With the future of warfare teetering on the edge of humanity, the increase of distancing technology in the conflict zone could potentially give individuals a more cavalier attitude towards conflict, resulting in ideas that violence is a need, rather than a last resort. After all, it is a clean war. And human lives are simply collateral damage.

A key consideration for policymakers should be to be a little more introspective, rather than to go out guns blazing and causing irreparable damage to humanity.

Sumita Kunashakaran is currently based in Singapore and is an Associate Consultant at Strategic Moves Pte Ltd and an External Consultant at Asia Aviation Services Pte Ltd. She is the author of “Un(wo)manned aerial vehicles: an assessment of how unmanned aerial vehicles influence masculinity in the conflict arena”, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.37, No.1, 2016, pp.31-61 which she completed during her Masters in International Relations at The University of Edinburgh. Access here

The coming multi-order world

novus_ordos
US Dollar Bill: Novus Ordos Seclorum

Trine Flockhart from the University of Kent, United Kingdom has just published an article entitled “The coming multi-order world”.

Abstract: The article shows that the current international system is changing towards a completely new form of international system, conceptualized as a multi-order system. The suggestion for a multi-order world stands in contrast to three current narratives about the future global order expressed through a multipolar narrative; a multi-partner narrative and a multi-culture narrative. The article demonstrates that although each narrative points to a plausible future, neither fully captures what lies ahead. Using English School concepts such as order, international society, international system and primary and secondary institutions, the article reveals a conception of the coming international system as a system consisting of several different ‘orders’ (or international societies) nested within an overall international system. In the coming ‘multi-order world’, the liberal order will continue, and may even be strengthened internally, but its global reach will be a thing of the past. Moreover, the challenge in a multi-order world will be to forge new forms of relationships between composite and diverse actors across complex lines of division and convergence. Scholars and policy-makers should note that the coming multi-order world will be radically different, requiring new thinking and new institutions and the acceptance of diversity in both power and principle.

Access the full article here (Open Access).

United States policy toward Taiwan

U.S._President_Eisenhower_visited_TAIWAN
Visit of President Eisenhower to Taiwan in 1960.

Shaohua Hu from the Department of Government and Politics, Wagner College NY, has just published an article entitled “A framework for analysis of national interest: United States policy toward Taiwan”.

Abstract: The rise of China in the 21st century has generated a new round of debates on American policy toward Taiwan. Generally speaking, one side suggests that Washington should adjust its Taiwan policy to improve its relations with China, while the other argues against downgrading the relations with Taiwan. Both sides invoke the concept of national interest, but the concept is not unproblematic, and cherry-picking different facts and arguments is far from convincing. This article has two purposes: using the concept of national interest to examine the Taiwan policy, and using this case to illuminate the concept itself. After reviewing the concept, I propose what I call ‘four Ps’ framework to facilitate policy-making and analysis. The framework comprises four factors that help determine which policy is in national interest. They are players (decision makers), preferences (foreign policy goals), prospects (possible outcomes), and power (the capability of achieving goals).

Access the full article here.

Call for the 2017 Special Issue

Contemporary Security Policy is seeking proposals for a special issue to be published in 2017. The special issue should address a topic within the aims and scope of the journal.

One of the oldest peer reviewed journals in international conflict and security, CSP promotes theoretically-based research on policy problems of armed conflict, intervention and conflict resolution. Since it first appeared in 1980, CSP has established its unique place as a meeting ground for research at the nexus of theory and policy. Major fields of concern include:

  • War and armed conflict
  • Peacekeeping
  • Conflict resolution
  • Arms control and disarmament
  • Defense policy
  • Strategic culture
  • International institutions

CSP is committed to a broad range of intellectual perspectives. Articles promote new analytical approaches, iconoclastic interpretations and previously overlooked perspectives. Its pages encourage novel contributions and outlooks, not particular methodologies or policy goals. Its geographical scope is worldwide and includes security challenges in Europe, Africa, the Middle-East and Asia. Authors are encouraged to examine established priorities in innovative ways and to apply traditional methods to new problems.

Special Issue Proposals

Special issue proposals should contain (in one PDF document):

  • A short discussion of the rationale and contribution of the special issue (3 pages max). Please also state why the topic falls within the aims and scope of the journal and why the proposal would be of interest to a large audience.
  • Contact details, institutional affiliation, one paragraph biography of the special issue co-editors, and three recent publications of each of the co-editors. Feel free to include a link to the personal website of the co-editors. Do not submit full CVs.
  • A list of confirmed articles and authors. Please include for each article (a) the title; (b) 150 word abstract; (c) a very short statement how the article contributes to the special issue and why it needs to be included; (d) a one paragraph author biography; and (e) three recent publications of the author(s).
  • The current state of the special issue. Please describe the background (e.g. previous workshops and conferences) and the timeframe towards the submission deadline.

The special issue will consist of a substantive introduction and 6-8 articles. The introduction should stand on itself. It should serve as a state-of-the-art article and be a reference point for all the other articles in the special issue. It is recommended that special issue proposals include at least 8-9 articles. All articles will be sent by the journal for peer-review on an individual basis. It is unlikely that all articles will eventually make the cut.

Most articles in CSP are around 7,000-8,000 words (including notes and references). However, manuscripts up to 11,000 words are accepted, for example when they include multiple case studies or use mixed methods. Total word limits will be discussed in case of acceptance.

Please submit your application (one PDF file) to csp@nullmaastrichtuniversity.nl. The deadline for the special issue proposal is 15 May 2016. The decision will be announced soon afterwards. The decision by the editor is final. All articles, including the introduction, will have to be submitted by 1 December 2016.

New Submission System: Editorial Manager

CSP_capitals_white Contemporary Security Policy will use Editorial Manager from now onward for all submissions to the journal. Editorial Manager is an online system that allows authors to submit their manuscripts online. They can also find the status of their manuscripts. Editorial Manager will also be used to commission reviews on submitted manuscript. As such all the relevant documents will be hosted online and in one place. Editorial Manager will ensure an efficient submission process and guarantee that nothing gets lost.

While Editorial Manager will improve the quality of the submission and review process, Contemporary Security Policy seeks to maintain the personal relationship with both authors and reviewers.

New Editor’s Choice for the ISA Conference

HDijkstra_websiteDr Hylke Dijkstra has recently been appointed as the new Editor-in-Chief of Contemporary Security Policy. For the occasion of the conference of the International Studies Association (ISA) in Atalanta in March 2016, he has selected his favorite articles, which will be available through Free Access until the end of March.

“One of the oldest peer reviewed journals in international conflict and security, Contemporary Security Policy promotes theoretically-based research on policy problems of armed violence, intervention and conflict resolution. It is about to publish its 37th volume, which makes it a slightly daunting exercise to select the top-10 out of the hundreds of published articles.

We live in an age where our academic work gets ranked all the time. Contemporary Security Policy, for example, awards the annual The Bernard Brodie Prize for the best article of the previous year. There are also statistics on the most-read and most-cited articles of the journal. In many ways such rankings are much more authoritative than my own personal selection could ever be. These rankings are, however, also about past successes.

Rather than looking for the best possible articles in the archive, I have selected 10 articles on the basis one sole criterium. I have selected the type of articles that I would love to see back in future issues of Contemporary Security Policy. These articles address key contemporary challenges. Not only in the US or Europe, but worldwide. They are relevant and accessible for a large audience. They make academic and policy contributions. And they challenge conventional wisdom.”

Hylke Dijkstra is the new Editor-in-Chief of Contemporary Security Policy. Please access his favorite articles here.

Review of Chemical Control by Michael Crowley (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016)

CSP-16-2-EdwardsIn Chemical Control: Regulation of Incapacitating Chemical Agent Weapons, Riot Control Agents and their Means of Delivery, Dr Michael Crowley makes a compelling argument that ambiguities surrounding riot-control and incapacitating chemical agents as well as their means of delivery present a threat to both human and international security. Within this book, published under the Palgrave Macmillan Global Issues Series, he lays out practical steps which could be taken by governments and civil society in this area.

What is most striking about this book is the way in which intellectual rigour and tenacity is combined with the practical insights of someone with significant experience of human rights advocacy. This is reflected in the holistic and problem driven approach adopted within the book. Crowley lays out a very accessible formulation of the scope and challenge of the less-lethal chemical weapon issue. He points to the need for a web of preventative measures, embedded in a wide range of existing governance systems.

Following his introduction, Crowley devotes a chapter to characterising riot-control agents, incapacitating agents and delivery systems. In relation to riot-control agents he documents a range of human rights abuses committed through the inappropriate use of these agents by states, non-state actors and private security companies. Likewise, he also outlines a range of concerns raised by continued state investment into the development, stockpiling and use of incapacitant chemical weapons.

Using publicly available information, Crowley identifies several states which appear to have acquired, developed or used incapacitant weapons since the Chemical Weapon Convention came into force in 1993. He notes that serious ambiguities exist within this treaty, in relation to how such weapons can be employed by states. He argues state inaction on this issue could contribute to the emergence of an increasingly permissive environment. This would result in further human rights abuses, and undermine the global chemical weapon prohibition norm.

Crowley also examines state and private investment into riot control agent delivery systems. In particular, he outlines how ‘wide-area’ delivery systems currently on the market, such as large-calibre artillery munitions, cluster munitions and rocket propelled grenades appear to be intrinsically inappropriate for use as part of law enforcement.

In each of the substantive chapters he meticulously examines the relevance of specific areas of international law. This includes arms control agreements, human rights law, international criminal law as well as narcotic drug control conventions. In the final analytical chapter Crowley also focuses on the role of civil society in developing and maintaining ethical standards in this issue area.

The pragmatic and authoritative approach adopted within this work means that this book will undoubtedly become a reference work for policy shapers and academics for years to come. And, yet, it also struck me that the work held a much broader appeal. Although tailored specifically to the issue of less-lethal chemical agents Crowley’s holistic critical approach is potentially transposable to a range of issue areas; not least autonomous weaponry.

Moreover, his humble reporting of the impacts of his own work, along with colleagues at the University of Bradford, should serve to encourage others seeking to change as well as map the regimes they study.

Reviewed by Dr Brett Edwards, Department of Politics, Languages and International Studies, University of Bath. The book can be purchased via the website of the publisher.

Review of Bhumitra Chakma, South Asia’s Nuclear Security (Routledge, 2015)

CSP-16-1-KarpIf nuclear weapons revolutionized international politics, as Bernard Brodie was first to argue, will they always have the same transformative effect everywhere? Or are their effects mediated or even overturned by specific regional conditions? The debate over the impact of South Asian nuclearization goes back to the mid-1960s, but grows ever less conclusive. Bhumitra Chakma, senior lecturer at the University of Hull, wades into this debate in search of commonalities, looking to reconcile rivalries in search of a consensus. The result is remarkably successful; mercifully succinct, but perhaps unsurprisingly discouraging.

Chakma structures the book around the optimist/pessimist debate over deterrence. In Chakma’s treatment, optimists look much like Tolstoy’s happy families; they agree on the big forces and on the one big thing they’re sure will turn out right. Nuclear pessimists are more diverse, unhappy for different reasons, seeing so many things that could go wrong.

This approach gives the book is greater universality. It is not just another book about South Asian nuclearization. It will also be very useful to anyone who thinks about nuclear stability. As Chakma shows, South Asia no longer can be understood as a derivative region, where tendencies developed elsewhere are played out. It has developed it own independent dynamic, originating problems and responses with implications everywhere else. This makes it a crucial element in the second nuclear age, the thesis about discontinuity from the Cold War era that he accepts. Chakma goes further, describing South Asia as a laboratory for the future of nuclear deterrence and security. He makes a persuasive case.

The book rests on the presumption that ‘India and Pakistan are typical cases of horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation’ (p. 15). Certainly there is more about South Asian that is normal than there is for the Middle East or Northeast Asia, where nuclear programs seem far more idiosyncratic. One area where South Asia stands out is the burgeoning literature on its nuclear weapons and deterrence, a more and more a field plowed exclusively by regional specialists.

One of the accomplishments of the book is to digest this increasingly unmanageable field and situate it within the broader research on nuclear deterrence and arms racing. Chakma’s meticulous reading and systematic review is a valuable contribution in itself, an excellent introduction to South Asian nuclearization studies.

A committed Aristotelian, Chakma is unhappy with the excesses of optimists and pessimists alike. The former underestimate the risks inherent in the India-Pakistan nuclear confrontation; they confuse the past with the future. The latter are too obsessive about risks and miss the restraint both countries have shown. Nuclear weapons, he argues, are here to stay.

‘The challenge,’ he writes, ‘is to reconcile the positions of the two schools and devise a middle ground in order to enhance the nuclear security of the region’ (p. 8). Rather than pursue a hopeless quest for regional disarmament, it is ambitious enough to aim for stable minimum deterrence. But the events and revelations of the past year- including new missile tests, assessment of the scale of Pakistani fissile materials production and the launching of India’s first SLBM – show that even this will not happen by accident.

The book shows that nuclear deterrence has had an effect in South Asia since 1982, when Indian leaders considered an attack on Pakistan’s Kahuta enrichment plant, but Indira Gandhi decided it was just too dangerous. Consistent with the optimist argument, during the era of nuclear opacity, until the tests of 1998, South Asia experienced a series of deterrence successes. Even the very frightening Kargil crisis of 1999 remained limited. The most dangerous period, Chakma shows, was the 2001/02 Twin Peaks stand-off, when American mediation probably saved the day. Since then both sides have placed more emphasis on war avoidance, regardless of provocations.

Chakma shows that much of the policy advice for South Asia is based on aging assumptions. Programs based on disarmament are simply out of touch. Minimum deterrence, still the most intriguing alternative, was most popular immediately after the 1998 nuclear tests, when Indian and Pakistani leaders were unsure of what they had done and sought to reassure everyone, including themselves.

Bigger ambitions, however, quickly won out. Especially with Pakistan’s reliance on first use options, and the stalking horse role of China, minimum deterrence never had natural momentum. After developing slowly after 1998, the pace of force development accelerated in both Indian and Pakistan. Chakma described their current acquisition strategies as ‘maximalist’ (p. 32). The situation is an arms race, a mutually conscious competition, even if less intense than classic examples. It also is less dangerous, he concludes, since ‘the arms race helps maintain crisis stability’ (p. 97).

Where Chakma struggles most is fully understanding the role of forces outside the Indian and Pakistani states. Terrorist threats and systemic forces, especially the role of China, are major elements of the regional problematique. But how do they affect the stability of regional deterrence, crisis stability and the outlook for minimal deterrence? Those connections remain more elusive.

The one externality Chakma can evaluate more clearly is the role of the United States. American diplomacy, he notes, has been instrumental signaling regional transformation and containing regional nuclear crises, especially Kargil in 1999 and the Twin Peaks Crisis of 2001/02, when America ‘played a key role in controlling the process of escalation’ (p. 116). One implication is American regional disengagement, a new unwillingness to intervene diplomatically in South Asian disputes, would be very destabilizing.

Regarding his compromise solution to regional tensions, minimum deterrence, Chakma is less convincing. As a recommendation it looks sound enough, but it also may be too remote to be reassuring. He undoubtedly is right about its advantages, but when even the smallest bilateral contacts are frozen and multilateral institutions are used exclusively to play gotch-ya, it is hard to imagine how even informal arms control ceilings could be arranged. All these are problems he readily acknowledges. Little wonder that Chakma concludes on a pessimistic note, supporting the logic of minimum deterrence, but lacking a ready solution to the ‘potentially ruinous competitive arms build-up… There is little reason to optimistic’ (pp. 148, 153).

Reviewed by Aaron Karp, Old Dominion University. The book can be purchased via the website of the publisher.