myriamdunncaveltycsp – Contemporary Security Policy

A Prelude to Revisionism? The Stalemated Peace Model and the Emergence of Multipolarity in International Order

By Oliver P. Richmond

Based on his new article that focuses on the emergence of the concept of “stalemated peace”.

The dominant research methodologies, conceptual, and practical doctrines of the post- Cold War order related to peacemaking, such as ‘hurting stalemates’, ‘ripe moments’ and ‘backsliding’ operate within a conflict management framework associated with negative forms of peace. This framework was updated after the end of the Cold War with a broader, more positive ‘liberal peacebuilding’ paradigm. Both frameworks, to varying degrees, indicated a Northern/ Western convergence around limited goals for peacemaking, peacekeeping, international mediation, and conflict resolution, but it is only recently that the implications have become clearer at a system level as well as for institutions and civil society.

There is a more convincing interpretation now available, however: this Eurocentric approach has ultimately led to a ‘stalemated peace’ (SP) model of peacemaking, which has affected UN peace missions more generally, undermining the UN’s normative purpose as well as its practical tools. Unexpectedly, the stalemate model may also contribute to systemic, geopolitical tensions and conflicts in world politics, making it much more unstable than previously thought.

This epistemological weakness has allowed scholars and analysts to describe the “grand stalemate’ of the Minsk agreements after 2015 as one which might have achieved ‘stabilisation’. The stalemated peace model may in addition provide camouflage for strategies of forced displacement and partition, with long-standing consequences in Cyprus, Kosovo, Syria, Israel/ Palestine and Gaza, Amenia/ Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh, and in many other recent wars. This association with a ‘negative peace’, limited ‘conflict management’ and power-driven pragmatic policy compromises ultimately contributes to the re-ignition of war, such as with the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. A stalemated peace process may hold out the potential for a sudden or eventual agreement, but in an unstable international environment driven by geopolitical, material and ideational concerns it often leads to war in the longer term, rather than providing a basis for progress.

In the literature on peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding, significant problems were obscured by the development of apparently pragmatic concepts such as those of ‘hurting stalemates’ and ‘spoilers’, which actually disguised ‘backsliding’ where UN peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and political missions could not bring about a sustainable peace. This weakness cannot be addressed without a conceptual shift from problem-solving (or ‘stabilisation’) to new, more emancipatory frameworks for peacemaking where political claims are addressed across the wide scope of peacemaking, including issues of local and global justice and sustainability. These possibilities transcend the liberal peace model significantly, they mainly exist in the scholarship or amongst social movements, have been translated into doctrine only in extremis and are long overdue. Hints can be seen in UN documentation on ‘sustaining peace’ or in long running debates within the Non-Aligned movement dating back to the 1960s. Their insights remain unimplemented, underpinning stalemates rather than the redressal of unmet political claims, meaning that peacemaking and UN peace missions have become depoliticised from the perspective of civil society, while preserving political power-structures with only minor checks. Global order and security have thus become increasingly detached from the structural implications of critical, and peace research insights into local political claims in conflict-affected societies.

Related to only minor theoretical innovations (even if embedded in international doctrine and the increasingly dysfunctionality of the state and international system, this has meant the stalemated peace model has often been regarded as acceptable to international actors and disputants. Indeed, the fear of a related loss of power because of any concessions made under any agreement has encouraged key actors in peace processes to consider escalating violence as an alternative to compromise (as with Charles Taylor in Liberia). This dilemma has also been touched upon by some civil society actors which have envisioned further escalation in Ukraine in order to produce a victory before a liberal peace settlement can be attained.

Consequently, long-standing stalemates may not be a platform for a future breakthrough as previously thought, but instead may inculcate revisionist and revanchist sentiments, which also involve the revival of violence- both direct and structural- as a legitimate political tool.

The Art of Cooptation in Great Power Rivalries

By Gadi Heimann, Andreas Kruck, Deganit Paikowsky & Bernhard Zangl

Contemporary world politics is characterized by a growing great power rivalry, first of all between the United States (and its Western allies) and China (as well as Russia), which is sometimes even referred to as a “new Cold War”. However, these modern-day rivalries differ because the international system differs from the “original” Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union. Complex interdependencies and a dense web of institutions, from economic networks to international organizations, link today’s rivals in ways that create enhanced opportunities for both cooperation and conflict. At any rate, they imply that international ordering through cooptation is a key element of contemporary great power rivalries.

The special issue to which our article provides a theoretical framework explores why and how cooptation, an often-overlooked strategy in international orders, plays a central role in shaping the relationships among rivals and between rivals and their allies. The strategy of cooptation is mainly known in domestic politics. Still, we argue that today’s interdependence and global institutions have made cooptation a more common and necessary, although risky, strategy in managing great power rivalries.

How do you know ‘cooptation’ when you see it?

Cooptation is a specific type of cooperation. Its essence involves trading institutional privileges for institutional support. A state, or a coalition of states offers another (set of) state(s) institutional privileges in an existing or emerging international order in return for the coopted states’ material and/or ideational support of the respective order. This exchange of privileges for support can occur in various venues, from economic institutional networks to security alliances. In that sense, cooptation goes beyond mere partnership; it is about extending privileges that can elevate a state’s international standing. In exchange, the coopting state hopes to gain an ally against a rival – or turn the rival itself into a less antagonistic counterpart, if not a wholesale supporter of “its” order. This dynamic can take many forms, such as granting emerging powers partnerships in the leadership through voting rights in a global institution or ‘a seat at the table’ in exclusive international clubs. Through this process, the cooptor (i.e. the state offering privileges) seeks to change the behaviour, interests or even identity of the cooptee (i.e., the state offering support) in ways that bring them closer to its vision of international order(s).

But cooptation isn’t just about creating partnerships; it’s a nuanced process that can mitigate or exacerbate rivalries depending on how it is handled. Our article provides a conceptual framework to explore different types of cooptation in great power rivalry and their impact on intensifying or mitigating great power rivalries. We distinguish between four types of cooptation:

Taming Opposition: The cooptor offers privileges to rivals to reduce their resistance to the existing order.

Securing Partners: The cooptor offers privileges to (potential) allies to strengthen their order support against a common rival.

Wooing Leaders: Materially weaker states offer privileges of leadership roles to powerful rivals to align their interests with an existing institutional order(s).

Seeking Patronage: Weaker actors offer privileges to stronger ones in exchange for their protection in, and support of, a given order(s) against common rivals.

Building on these distinctions, the articles comprising this special issue demonstrate that cooptation is not only shaped by power rivalries but is also impacting them.

How cooptation plays out in great power rivalries

Under certain conditions, cooptation is an order-stabilizing force that mitigates power rivalries. Providing rivals with institutional privileges to integrate them into a shared order grants them some partnership in the leadership of that institutional order. This might reduce the incentives for rivals to pursue more aggressive alternatives. For example, in the aftermath of the Cold War, the US and its Western allies included Russia and China into Western-oriented international institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Russia was also invited to join the G7, making it the G8. The goal was to foster more significant political and economic alignment by giving them a voice within the liberal international order. Arguably, this served to at least temporarily stabilize the order and contain China’s and Russia’s revisionism.

However, integrating rivals into the leadership of institutions is a risky gamble for cooptors that does not guarantee success in the long run. Cooptors frequently hope that the offered privileges will gradually transform the cooptees’ identity and interests, bringing the cooptees closer to the cooptors’ identity and interests, thereby increasing the chance of them not only adapting to the existing order but adopting it in the long run. For example, the US had hoped that China’s integration into the WTO would encourage China to shift towards a market-based economy. Still, such a fundamental transformation did not take place. Our special issue suggests that the privileges offered by the cooptee must be substantial enough to make a real difference in the rival’s status and transform its interests (or even identity) to encourage its full alignment with the institution and order(s) it represents. To succeed in this, the cooptor must show genuine generosity toward the cooptee. But generosity also involves risks, especially when the cooptors provide the cooptees with a formal seat at the table. Even though China’s inclusion in the WTO did not transform the Chinese state and economy, the US could not deprive China of its formal membership. Conversely, when the awarded privileges are institutionally less rigid or less entrenched, it is easier to revoke them in case transformative expectations are not fulfilled. For example, the US and its allies recognized that Russia was not meeting their ambitious expectation that it would adopt Western liberal values and practices, so they deprived it of its informal seat at the G8/8 table in 2014.

Cooptation can also lead to rivalry escalation. Cooptation efforts to secure allies against a rival can increase competition among rivals, driving both sides to strengthen and expand their supporting “camps”, including through competing cooptation arrangements. For example, China’s decision to establish the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as a competing alternative to the World Bank has aimed at coopting other countries into China’s economic sphere of influence. The U.S., seeing this as a challenge, intensified efforts to strengthen its own alliances in legacy economic institutions.

Policy Implications for managing great power rivalries with cooptation strategies

Our findings suggest several insights for policymakers. Here are three particularly important recommendations:

1. Act early on: Leading powers should act early to coopt potential rivals. When rivalries escalate and solidify, it is harder to establish confidence-building measures and secure partnership commitments.

2. Calculate your risk: Cooptation requires calculated risk. Generous offers are necessary to recruit support and encourage transformation, especially among rivals. Nevertheless, these offers must include safety mechanisms to manage potential pitfalls. Coopting newcomers into flexible institutions, such as informal or reversible arrangements, can provide a safety net, enabling more ambitious and generous offers.

3. Prefer inclusive arrangements: Cooptation strategies to secure allies can easily escalate rivalries, especially if they are too exclusive. Inclusive arrangements help avoid further escalation and competition.

Conclusion

Through the lens of cooptation, we offer a novel perspective on how international ordering may contribute to great power rivalry escalation or moderation. These insights help us understand contemporary security challenges resulting from the intensification of great power rivalry in various (security but also economic) realms.

In the modern world of international relations, characterized by interdependence and a dense web of institutions, it is no longer enough for great powers to simply “balance” or “counterbalance” rivals. Instead, they need to delicately engage with their allies and rivals in and through institutional orders. Shrewd cooptation strategies targeting adversaries and allies alike can contribute to a stabilized international order that contains intense power competition. But successful cooptation requires bold decisions based on a deep understanding of the complex relationships between cooptation and great power rivalry dynamics.

How China was Coopted into Cooperation within the World Bank

In their new article, Doron Ella and Galia Press Barnathan examine the connection between great power rivalries and international institutions, focusing on how great powers use institutional deals to coopt rising powers. Specifically, the article analyzes US-China relations within the context of development finance institutions. The analysis suggests that these relations are anchored in an early cooptation deal, made when the US coopted China into the World Bank, granting it significant benefits and a seat at the table. In return, China supported the US-led liberal international order. This deal set the stage for ongoing Sino-American relations in development finance, alongside other issue-areas, including security.

The article explores the impact of changing power disparities and the evolution of institutional structures on this original deal. It identifies two main pressures threatening the stability of the deal: China’s growing expectations for a better deal reflecting its increased power and the US’s concerns over intensifying rivalry, and changes in the institutional environment, such as the establishment of new multilateral development banks and China’s improved position in these banks. These changes offer China new avenues to influence and renegotiate the original cooptation deal. Overall, the article argues that the increasing complexity of the development finance regime complex provides states with new strategies to advance their goals, likely destabilizing earlier cooptation deals. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for grasping both the historical and future trajectory of US-China relations.

To demonstrate this interplay between the power distribution and the nature of great power rivalry, and the evolving structure of the regime complex, we trace the changing relations between the US and China across three periods.

Phase One: The Cold War

From its inception, throughout the Cold War, the cooptation deal between the US and China remained stable since China had no suitable outside options for alternative development finance other than the World Bank. Additionally, the power asymmetry between China and the US was rather wide, and China perceived its privileges in the World Bank as adequate. During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union were in a midst of an intense great power rivalry, and the US benefited from having a former ally of the Soviet Union approaching the West and becoming a potential ally.

Phase Two: The Unipolar Moment through the Financial Crisis of 2008-09

After the fall of the Soviet Union in December 1991, great power rivalries seemed to have receded before a new rivalry would emerge in the following decade between the US and China. During the 1990s and 2000s China had increasingly integrated into the US-led liberal international order and its economic interests slowly converged with those of the liberal West. Yet, by the second decade of the 21^st century the cooptation deal between China and the US within the World Bank had started to show signs of destabilization. This had happened due to two main reasons: 1. As China become stronger and richer, it started perceiving its current privileges in the World Bank as inadequate, and especially in relation to the moral and material support it had given the Bank. 2. As China joined other multilateral development banks, its outside options have increased, offering China new opportunities to gain similar or even better privileges in those banks, and also grant its increasingly important support to these institutions, improving its position as a significant actor in development finance. As a result, China started to undercut the influence of the World Bank in an attempt to gain negotiation leverage that will pressure the US into granting it a better deal, which will reflect its growing power and status. In China’s perception, a better deal should mainly include structural reforms within the World Bank. Such reforms will grant China, and other developing countries, more voting power, as well as reflect its own norms and principles, rather than exclusively rely on those of the liberal West. However, in the second phase, China was still not able to gain additional leverage in its negotiations for a better deal since the World Bank remained the most important institution in development finance, and China’s increasing participation in other Banks was not enough to meaningfully undermine the deal.

Phase Three: The Establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015 and onward

The third phase is marked by the establishment of the AIIB in 2015 – a regional multilateral development bank created and dominated by China as its most influential member. Scholars generally agree that China established the AIIB in light of its frustration with American reluctance to grant it with more power over decision-making in the World Bank, among other international institutions. Therefore, China decided to establish its own Bank that could, in the future, compete with the World Bank and other financial institutions. By doing that, China believed it could increase its negotiation leverage in the World Bank, while also offer its own cooptation deals to other states, whether they are developing or developed, via the AIIB, resulting in further destabilization of its original cooptation deal within the World Bank.

Where do we go from here?

The unraveling of this cooptation deal, which is still at the core of China’s engagement with the World Bank and the US, is daunting because it will imply the demise of an important component holding together and constraining this intense great power rivalry. Indeed, we trace the growing Chinese rhetorical expressions of dissatisfaction with the current deal and suggest that these offer worrying signs of destabilization. At the same time, however, one may argue that the fact that the intensifying rivalry between the two states is taking place within a dense institutional environment, while generating instability within the institutional complex, also helps to manage this rivalry and contain it, and reduces the danger of escalation to violence.

Cyberspace’s Role in International Relations: Understanding its Impact as a Structural Modifier

The evolution of cyberspace has significantly influenced international relations, raising critical questions about its exact role and impact in international relations. Does it represent a new domain of statecraft that actors leverage against other actors? Is it an independent system of rules and behaviours? Offensive cyber operations’ pervasiveness and economic damage render these questions increasingly salient. Cyber scholarship has been developing as a distinct field. Early debates about integrating cyberspace into broader international relations discussions are moving from the periphery to the core of the discipline. In a new article, Michiel Foulon and Gustav Meibauer explore how conceptualizing cyberspace as a structural modifier can provide a shared language with the broader field of International Relations. This may aid scholars and policy-makers to better understand the causal role and effects of cyberspace and pave the way for thinking conceptually about other emerging technologies including artificial intelligence, outer space technology, or lethal autonomous weapons.

Cyberspace in International Relations: Domain vs. Structure

Conventional views of cyberspace in international relations focus on cyberspace as a domain where actors conduct cyber operations. One group of scholars argues that cyberspace is a domain that revolutionizes international relations: it alters military tactics and state interactions. Another group remains sceptical about cyberspace’s transformative potential, emphasizing its limitations and the barriers states face in developing cyber capabilities. However, this debate about cyberspace as a domain is challenged by scholars who view cyberspace as a systemic factor that shapes the behavior across multiple dimensions of international relations. This perspective suggests that focusing solely on cyber operations risks ignoring how cyberspace interacts with other international political dynamics. Cyberspace influences military intelligence, conflict performance, and strategic environments, and may affect wider-ranging processes from trade to diplomacy, from democratization and autocratic backlash to climate change and migration. This highlights the need for a more integrated conceptualization.

Conceptualizing Cyberspace as a Structural Modifier

To address some of the limitations of current cyber scholarship, we introduce cyberspace as a structural modifier. In international relations research, structure refers to the macro-social arrangements that govern international relations. It is conventionally understood as characterized by anarchy, and, therefore, the distribution of material power among states.

Structural modifiers are systemic properties that modify how states are likely to experience the effects of structure. In other words, structural modifiers do not change the structure itself but alter and specify how structure is likely to causally affect state behavior. For example, geographic features and nuclear weapons may be viewed as structural modifiers that enable or constrain state behavior across international relations. This in turn influences the types and intensities of interactions among actors that are likely and seen as desirable. It is in this way, that cyberspace, too, can be viewed as a structural modifier with system-wide implications for states.

The Impact of Cyberspace as a Structural Modifier

Viewing cyberspace as a structural modifier offers several advantages for international relations scholarship and policy-making:

Integrating Disconnected Cyber Scholarship: Cyber theories often remain isolated, focusing on specific aspects such as deterrence or foreign policy without considering their collective implications. A structural modifier framework encourages a holistic view, examining how cyberspace’s effects on various areas of international relations interact and produce larger-scale impacts.
Linking Cyber Scholarship with International Relations Theory: By conceptualizing cyberspace as a structural modifier, cyber scholarship can engage more meaningfully with broader International Relations theories. This integration can consider cyberspace’s broader implications and lead to the development of more comprehensive theories that reflect emerging empirical realities.
Providing Policy Guidance: Policy-makers can benefit from understanding cyberspace as a structural modifier: it cautions them against viewing cyberspace in isolation of other foreign policy domains. And it cautions them against viewing cyberspace or as a driver of revolutionary change in international relations. Instead, it emphasizes the need to consider cyberspace’s interaction with existing statecraft domains and tools, promoting more balanced and informed decision-making.

Empirical Examples and Future Research

To illustrate the concept of cyberspace as a structural modifier, we consider cyberspace’s effects across a variety of international relations dynamics, including in the following empirical examples.

Deterrence: Cyberspace complicates conventional deterrence strategies. As states struggle to attribute offensive cyber operations makes to its perpetrators, they find it difficult to uphold the deterrent threat of potential retaliation. States may have to adapt by focusing on persistent engagement rather than one-off retaliatory actions, or by adjusting their cost-benefit analyses in response to adversarial actions in cyberspace.

Foreign Policy Tools: The introduction of cyber capabilities has transformed how decision-makers think about which foreign policy tools they should employ. Initially hesitant due to uncertainties surrounding cyber operations’ collateral impacts, states are now increasingly incorporating cyber tools into their strategic planning. This shift reflects a broader normalization and integration of cyber operations alongside conventional military, economic, and diplomatic tools.

Uncertainty: Cyberspace exacerbates but also mitigates uncertainty in international relations. It allows actors to gather and disseminate rapidly information. This can reduce uncertainty. However, it also presents challenges such as information overload and reliance on potentially flawed data, which complicates decision-making and strategic planning.

Interaction with Non-State Actors: Cyberspace blurs the lines between state and non-state actors. Private companies, hackers, and other non-state entities play pivotal roles in cyberspace, often cooperating or competing with states. This dynamic expands the range of influential actors and introduces new complexities in international interactions.

Future research may operationalize the concept of cyberspace as a structural modifier to uncover insights across key areas of international relations. This approach may extend to other emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence or outer space technology. It broadens the scope of IR scholarship and provides new avenues for theoretical and empirical exploration.

Conclusion

How can we understand cyberspace’s role in international relations? Conceptualizing cyberspace as a structural modifier offers a framework for integrating cyber scholarship with broader international relations theories and concepts. It helps address some of the limitations of current debates between domain-focused and systemic approaches, as well as between proponents and sceptics of cyberspace-induced revolutionary change. It shows a pathway for the study of cyberspace to move beyond its original community, thereby benefitting the discipline more widely. By emphasizing the systemic role of cyberspace, this conceptualization provides valuable insights for both academic research and policy-making. This aids promoting a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of cyberspace’s impact on global politics. As cyberspace continues to evolve, adopting this conceptual lens will be crucial for analysing its implications and guiding effective strategies in the digital age

From reluctance to reassurance: Explaining the shift in Germans’ support for measures of common defense following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

In the wake of Russia’s full-scale attack on Ukraine in February 2022, Germany has shifted the focus of its defense policy back to collective defense. A new article by Timo Graf, Markus Steinbrecher & Heiko Biehl shows that public opinion on collective defense has also shifted: from a marked reluctance to support NATO’s eastern members to a much greater willingness to contribute military resources to reassure those members in the face of Russian aggression in Ukraine. Against the background of the war, how do we explain that shift in the alliance solidarity of the German people? Which factors are driving this change and how lasting is it going to be? The answer is complex and involves the public image of Russia, the willingness to follow US leadership, and strategic culture.

For decades, both Western and Eastern NATO partners have criticized Germany for not spending enough on (collective) defense and its growing dependency on energy imports from Russia. Economic interests and a free-riding mentality aside, a driving force behind close relations with Russia was public opinion. Significant parts of German society were Russia-friendly and showed little support for strengthening NATO’s eastern flank.

Russia’s war against Ukraine in 2022 forced a historic shift in Germany’s defense policy and in its relations towards Russia – a Zeitenwende (epochal turning point) as it is now referred to in the German debate. Chancellor Olaf Scholz declared the contributions of the German armed forces (Bundeswehr) to NATO’s territorial defense of Europe as their top priority, because “[t]he crucial role for Germany at this moment is to step up as one of the main providers of security in Europe […] beefing up our military presence on NATO’s eastern flank.” The Zeitenwende in defense policy has been mirrored by a major shift of public opinion in Germany on collective defense: Reluctance towards the defense of NATO’s eastern flank has given way to majority support for military efforts to reassure NATO’s eastern members in the face of Russian aggression. German chancellor Olaf Scholz interprets this shift of public opinion as being indicative of “a new mindset in German society.”

Our article seeks to answer two pressing questions: Against the background of the war, which factors are driving this shift in peoples’ alliance solidarity? And are there any early indications on how lasting this change is going to be? These questions are addressed on the basis of multivariate analyses of representative population surveys from 2021 and 2022. The results show that the perception of Russia as a threat to national security is a key factor, yet it is only part of a more complex explanation involving strategic postures and the subjective level of information about collective defense as well. By contrast, the often cited free-riding mentality of the Germans proves largely irrelevant. The empirical findings shine light on Germany’s reaction to Russia’s war against Ukraine and add to our understanding of the societal foundations of alliance solidarity in Germany and other countries.

First, the increased perception of Russia as a strategic threat to Germany is a key driver for public support for measures of collective defense. The largely absent public threat perception kept support for alliance solidarity low until 2021. In 2022, however, the perception of Russia changed fundamentally. A majority of Germans has lost its naïve view on Russia, recognizing Russia as a threat to German security instead, which contributes to a greater willingness to support national contributions to NATO missions on the Eastern flank.

These insights are also of relevance beyond Germany, because just like the German people the citizens of other major western European countries such as Italy, Spain, and France had a very ambivalent view of Russia prior to the war. Since 2022, Russia is seen very unfavorably by majorities all across Europe. How long that pan-European consensus will last very much depends on the duration and the course of the war. As the war continues and as the initial shock of the invasion eventually wears off, it becomes increasingly important to establish the current recognition of Russia as the greatest threat to European security as the point of departure for all joint and national strategies.

Second, the growing public knowledge and media coverage of these missions has also contributed to the change of public opinion. Before 2022, Bundeswehr engagements – like the one in Lithuania – were rarely mentioned in the media and hardly present on the public agenda or in political debates. As we could show this has changed – at least to a certain degree. Still most Germans just know some basic facts or even nothing at all about the Bundeswehr’s deployments in Eastern and Central Europe. Moreover, reporting is bound to decline as the “newsworthiness” of war in Ukraine decreases with every day that it drags on and as it has to “compete for attention” with other global flashpoints.

Third, another force for the change in public opinion has been a renewed orientation towards the United States. In times of crisis, most Germans, like their government, look to the other side of the Atlantic for guidance. They trust in the United States as the protective power of the Western world and want Germany to participate in the common defense efforts. This revitalized transatlantic orientation is an important driver of Germans’ readiness to support NATO’s measures of reassurance.

If a (new) U.S. administration were to signal a reduction in military aid to Europe as the war in Ukraine continues, the willingness of the German and other European people to contribute to the collective defense of NATO’s eastern flank might be at risk. Hence, the Germans do not seem to be ready to act as the military leader of Europe – others being even more improbable candidates. Instead, they look to the U.S.’ military leadership in guaranteeing Europe’s security, which could put the premature debate about Europe’s strategic sovereignty on hold – at least as long as Russia wages war in Europe and the U.S. do not exit NATO.

Fourth, our analyses show that the strategic culture of the German society has not suddenly and fundamentally changed. The basic preferences of the population on security and defense policies are largely stable: Most Germans still favor multilateral approaches in international affairs, show transatlantic orientations, and prefer civilian over military means. Consequently, the substantial increase in support for alliance defense measures looks more like an ad hoc reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine than a fundamental reorientation in strategic postures.

Our results provide some implications for policy makers not least because they suggest that the underlying preferences of Germany’s public – its strategic culture – have not changed (yet). So, chancellor’s Scholz statement of “a new mindset in German society” might have been a bit premature. But how to stabilize Germany’s willingness to reassure its Eastern partners and how to avoid a return to reluctance in common defense efforts? Our analyses suggest that the perception of threat is largely determined by Russia’s course of action in Ukraine and beyond. The level of Atlanticism depends for the most part on the continued and visible military support of the U.S. to Europe (as well as the political agenda of its President). And the public’s level of information about the Bundeswehr’s efforts to help NATO secure the eastern flank can be influenced – to a modest extent – by the public communication and information efforts of the German ministry of defense and the government. Consequently, all actors involved in the conflict between NATO and Russia in the context of the war in Ukraine can shape the alliance solidarity of the German people – for better or worse.

Read the article “From reluctance to reassurance: Explaining the shift in the Germans’ NATO alliance solidarity following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine” here

Saving Face in the Cyberspace: Responses to Public Cyber Intrusions in the Gulf

How do states “save face” following a cyber intrusion directed at them? A new article identifies how Gulf states employ diverse rhetorical strategies—beyond attribution—to narrate cyber intrusions and keep cyber conflict contained.

In July 2017, nearly two months after Qatar had suffered a public cyber intrusion, the Qatari Ministry of Interior (MOI) revealed evidence concerning the intrusion. Rather than only providing technical details about the intrusion, the MOI broadcasted a dramatic video with intense music, thrilling graphics, and a spy-style vibe to reveal the intrusion step-by-step. In addition to delegitimizing cyber intrusions as acts of terrorism, the video emphasizes the Qatari remarkable success in containing the intrusion and detecting its source despite the intrusion’s sophistication.

This Qatari press conference was not unique. When cyber intrusions become public, states do not only engage in technical strategies to deal with the intrusion and identify the initiator, but also manage their public relations – they publish messages, hold press conferences, brief reporters, and rhetorically try to manage the crisis.

However, these performative and symbolic strategies are often left unnoticed in existing research on cyber discourse. Of course, many studies zoom in on the strategy of attribution, but as we see, much more is going on following a public cyber intrusion.

In this article, we explore the rhetorical strategies used by governments in the Gulf in response to a public cyber intrusion they suffered. We do so via an original discourse analysis of official statements and state-sponsored media reports in five cyber intrusions that differ in their targets and methods: Saudi Arabia’s response to cyber intrusion against its oil company Aramco (“Shamoon” 2012), Saudi Arabia’s response to a “hack-and-leak” intrusion (2015), Saudi Arabia’s response to intrusions using “Shamoon 2.0” malware (2017), Qatar’s response to a “hack-and-fake” intrusion (2017), and Bahrain’s response to multiple hacking operations (2019).

Responding to Public Cyber Intrusions

When a cyber intrusion becomes public knowledge, targeted states must find ways to address and explain the resulting social costs. The need to “save face” in these situations arises from the undesirable implications for the identity and image of the state in front of both domestic and international audiences. We suggest that states employ rhetorical strategies to “save face” – to protect their public image in front of domestic, regional, or international audiences.

To better understand these strategies, we propose a typology of “face-saving” strategies that can be categorized into three broad groups: diminishing strategies, self-complimenting strategies, and accusing strategies.

Diminishing strategies involve minimizing the effect of the intrusion, normalizing it, or debunking false information. Minimizing means that states try to reduce the magnitude of the intrusion. Normalizing means that states frame the intrusion as a common occurrence in global politics, highlighting that other countries also experience cyber intrusions. Debunking means that states try to dispute the authenticity of leaked information and provide evidence to counter false claims. These strategies serve to diminish the impact and prevent further dissemination of damaging information.

Self-complimenting strategies are used to enhance the positive perception of the targeted state. States employ bolstering rhetoric to emphasize their successes, international connections, and positive values. Reasserting control is a rhetorical move that showcases measures taken to ensure future protection, often involving investigations, new cyber institutions, and regulations. Correcting is a rhetoric that aims to replace leaked or fabricated information with a more positive narrative by providing an alternative and beneficial account.

Accusing strategies involve exposing the intrusion, condemning the perpetrators, and attributing the attack to specific actors. By adopting these strategies, states shift blame and position themselves as victims.

Findings

When thinking about the public response of states to public cyber intrusions, existing literature primarily discusses the risks of retaliation or escalation as well as attribution. However, as this article shows, states engage in multiple “face-saving” strategies to manage their image and legitimize their restraint. Attribution is only one rhetorical option out of many.

The results of our systematic discourse analysis suggest that different contextual factors shape the specific strategies used. In cyber intrusions that involve leaking or faking information involve, unique strategies of debunking or correcting were used.

Regarding attribution, the cases involving Saudi Arabia – a regional power – did not include public attribution. In contrast, Bahrain and Qatar – smaller powers – did attribute the intrusions but did so only after such attribution was made by American media. These suggestive contextual factors might be used in future research on the rhetoric of cyber responses in other areas.

Understanding these face-saving strategies is crucial for two reasons. First, it provides insights into the restraint and limited nature of cyber conflicts. Existing research focuses on operational aspects and restraint shown by targeted states, but the public narrative and strategic narration of these events are often overlooked. By adopting face-saving strategies, targeted states aim to reduce pressure to retaliate or escalate and justify why such actions are unnecessary. Second, this study contributes to constructivist scholarship by expanding the repertoire of strategies used by states to cope with embarrassment. By focusing on the Gulf countries, we highlight the agency of states in the Global South to interpret cyber intrusions in front of different audiences.

Yehonatan Abramson and Gil Baram are the authors of “Saving Face in the Cyberspace: Responses to Public Cyber Intrusions in the Gulf” in Contemporary Security Policy, which is available here.

The cyber-domain as a narrative battlefield

How do the main actors in cyberspace make sense of its fragmented governance, and how does that translate to their broader strategic narratives? André Barrinha and Rebecca Turner study strategic narratives in their new article in order to find out.

In an era of increasing digital connectivity, the governance of cyberspace has become a critical global concern. Multilateral efforts to navigate the complexities of cyber governance are well underway, with two cyber initiatives currently ongoing at the United Nations (UN).

At the forefront is the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security overseen by the UN General Assembly’s (UNGA) First Committee. The OEWG is responsible for negotiating norms related to international cybersecurity and responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. The second more recent group is the Ad Hoc Committee (AHC) on cybercrime, overseen by UNGA’s Third Committee. The AHC was created with the intention to create a new treaty specifically addressing cybercrime. These two groups are operating in parallel because of the assumption that international cybersecurity and cybercrime should be addressed separately, as two distinct cyber regimes under the same complex.

International cybersecurity is understood to be divided along three main groups: the liberals, also known as the gatekeepers of cyberspace and custodians of the internet’s core principles, including the UK, US, EU and other likeminded states; the sovereigntists, led by Russia and China, who are inspired by a much more state-centric and territorialised approach to cyberspace regulation; and finally, the non-aligned or swing states, including Brazil, India and South Africa, who oscillate between the former two groups depending on the policy issue.

In our article, we explore the narrative battlefields of the OEWG and AHC using strategic narratives as our starting point. By examining the approaches of key actors from each of the groups – the EU as a representative of the liberals, Russia as an advocate for the sovereigntists and India as a swing state – we aim to uncover their storytelling techniques and the associated implications for the multilateral governance of cyberspace.

As we conclude, the existence of two different forums does not seem to impact the consistency of each actor’s strategic narratives. Rather, there is a strong continuum across the two forums, as described below.

The EU: a force for good

For the EU, both forums serve as opportunities to reinforce its position as a global force for good, committed to responsible leadership and democratic values. Central to the EU’s narrative is the defence of the rules-based order and the founding principles of the internet, which emphasise its global, open, free, stable, and secure nature. In championing these values, the EU establishes itself as an advocate for maintaining the status quo. The EU’s commitment to being a status quo actor is likely motivated by concerns about “Westlessness” – the perception that the world, and cyberspace, is gradually becoming less Western-centric and less aligned with liberal ideals. The EU’s force for good identity narrative and rules-based order system narrative directly facilitates its policy narratives around cooperation, development, and capacity-building.

Russia: the norm-entrepreneur

Russia’s strategic narratives in the OEWG and AHC revolved around four main themes: Russophobia, anti-Westernism, sovereignty and multilateralism. These narrative elements were consistently present in both forums, indicating that Russia’s establishment of the AHC was driven less by a belief in the institutional separation of crime and international cybersecurity as distinct cyber regimes, and more by a desire to counter existing legal and diplomatic structures that Moscow perceives as leaning towards liberal ideals. Through these strategic narratives, Russia aims to position itself at the forefront of cyber diplomacy as a norm-entrepreneur, shape future policy decisions to its advantage, and influence the global discourse on cyberspace governance.

India: the multi-aligner

India is still in the process of formulating a comprehensive strategic approach to cyberspace that aligns with its national interests and aspirations. This ongoing process helps to explain why India adopts a position of multi-alignment in the cyber domain, seeking to maintain connections with both ‘Liberals’ and ‘Sovereigntists’. Consequently, India’s strategic narratives in the cyber realm appear more ambiguous in comparison to the EU and Russia. India articulates narratives around sovereignty, technological autonomy, multilateralism, democracy, and its status as a developing nation. But, while these narratives are present in both the OEWG and AHC, they often lack coherence and occasionally conflict with one another. For instance, the struggle between upholding human rights and asserting stringent sovereign controls exemplifies India’s discursive frictions on fundamental cyber issues.

Narratives matter

Given the relatively nascent stage of the cyber domain and the conflicting views and priorities of the three groups under analysis, the way cyber issues are discursively approached offers intriguing insights into the state of cyber diplomacy. As the AHC moves towards a draft convention on cyber-crime and the OEWG into the second year of its second iteration, the world remains significantly divided on what should and should not be allowed to happen in cyberspace. Understanding the narratives underpinning those divergences is crucial if we are to move towards a safe and stable cyberspace.

As we conclude in the article, for all the specificities and technicalities associated with cybercrime or with the potential application of international humanitarian law to cyberspace, there are over-arching narratives told by the active actors in this domain that need to be taken into consideration. Ultimately, the successful implementation of any agreement or norm will rely on the incorporation of those positive steps within those actors’ strategic narratives of cyberspace.

André Barrinha and Rebecca Turner are the authors of “Strategic narratives and the multilateral governance of cyberspace: The cases of European Union, Russia, and India” in Contemporary Security Policy, which is available here.

The Paradox and Perils of Authoritarian Support for Multilateral Cyber Governance

Support for international organizations remains a foreign policy mainstay for most democratic states. In a new article, Mark Raymond and Justin Sherman explain why the situation is more complicated with respect to cyber governance. They find that major authoritarian states are championing their own distinct variant of authoritarian multilateralism, while many democratic states have embraced a contemporary form of multilateralism that incorporates substantial elements of multistakeholder governance. The divergence on how to accomplish cyber governance is rooted in a difference over what multilateralism means and the appropriate way to practice it, with deep implications for the broader trajectory of rule-based global order. The widespread adoption of authoritarian multilateralism would amount to CRISPR gene editing the liberal DNA out of the post-1945 order, leaving the form but not the vital substance of liberal multilateralism.

Varieties of Multilateralism

International Relations scholarship recognizes multilateralism as one of the pillars of the contemporary rule-based global order. Language invoking multilateralism as an idea, and as a practice instrumental to maintaining global security, also features prominently in leaders’ public foreign policy statements. President Biden’s preferred formulation, “rules-based order,” is a close cognate of multilateralism, at least to the ears of listeners in democratic states, who largely accept the notions that the rule of law entails the equal application of rules to actors regardless of power differentials, and that rules should be authored by those subject to them.

However, we think there are good reasons to suspect not only that authoritarian states have different views of how multilateralism should be practiced, but also that democratic states are experiencing ‘dri’ over time in their understandings of what multilateralism entails. We identify and describe two distinct variants of multilateralism: liberal and authoritarian.

The liberal variant is the familiar one, rooted in notions of equality before the law and representation in rule-making processes. In contrast, authoritarian multilateralism is rooted in notions of great power privilege, akin to hierarchical notions of great power management more commonly associated with nineteenth-century world politics. It also differs from liberal multilateralism in the underlying purpose it accords to global governance arrangements. Liberal multilateralism emphasizes transparency and participation, and the realization of human rights as a key goal of global governance arrangements more generally; authoritarian multilateralism is more opaque and statist, and privileges state sovereignty over the welfare of individuals.

Authoritarian Multilateralism in Cyber Governance

There is broad agreement that China and Russia are the main players in a substantial international coalition seeking to nudge cyber governance arrangements toward multilateralism and away from private and multistakeholder governance modalities. Our analysis goes further by drawing atention to the specific means that they are using in service of this goal: (1) exploiting established procedures to subvert established liberal multilateral governance arrangements; and (2) parallel order-building efforts that employ or create new governance arrangements that lack the distinctive hallmarks of liberal multilateralism.

Russia first sought a multilateral arms control treaty for cyberspace at the United Nations in 1998, leading to the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) process that continued until 2021. Russia and China supplemented this flagship UN process with increasing involvement in private and multistakeholder Internet and cyber governance arrangements, especially for establishing technical standards.

Landmark GGE reports in 2013 and 2015 and deteriorating relations with the United States and other Western states led China and Russia to shi their UN strategy. They criticized the GGE as fundamentally undemocratic because it included only a select group of states, calling for the establishment of an Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG). Crucially, the OEWG expanded participation to tilt the composition in favor of authoritarian states, and it shied the terms of reference to include negotiation of international agreements rather than the study oriented GGE mandate. Although the first OEWG became more inclusive of non-state actors over time due to democracies’ efforts, the initial design was more akin to authoritarian rather than liberal multilateralism.

Outside the UN, China and Russia also seek to advance authoritarian multilateralism by way of increased engagement with technical standard-seng processes for digital technologies and in bilateral infrastructure diplomacy. However, the parallel order-building strategy is most evident in long-standing efforts by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which stands out as an explicitly illiberal international organization substantially less transparent than IGOs created with strong involvement from the world’s major democracies. Most recently, China has announced that it intends to transition its World Internet Conference into a new multilateral organization specifically for cyber governance. Such a step would substantially elevate parallel order-building efforts in the cyber regime complex.

Implications for Rule-Based Global Order

Cyber governance is not only vitally important, it is also an especially stark contrast between two different visions of what multilateralism means and how it should be practiced. The authoritarian variant illustrated here is opaque, insulated from participation by non-state actors, and aims at creating an international order that excises core aspects of the post-1945 order rooted in democracy and human rights as core values. The liberal variant, in contrast, has evolved over time to be more inclusive of nonstate actors than its initial form, such that multilateralism as practiced by democratic states now incorporates elements of multistakeholder governance.

Which of these variants predominates in global governance is thus a consequential question for policymakers, and for the trajectory of the rule-based global order. It also poses foreign policy challenges for democratic states. If China moves ahead with a multilateral international organization for cyber governance, democracies will face a choice: should they join such an organization, hoping to influence its decisions? If so, they will need to operate in a fundamentally different procedural context than most major international organizations. If they stay out, it will provide greater freedom of action for Russia, China and other authoritarian states to shape the future of cyber governance in ways that may have significant global effects over time.

Mark Raymond and Justin Sherman are the authors of “Authoritarian Multilateralism in the Global Cyber Regime Complex,” Contemporary Security Policy, which is available here.