China’s nuclear expansion and the increasing risk of an arms race

Why is China expanding its nuclear arsenal? In his new article, Henrik Stålhane Hiim argues that concerns about the vulnerability of its nuclear forces is the main driver – and that there is little evidence of a change in China’s nuclear strategy.

In the summer and autumn of 2021, researchers revealed that China had started building more than 300 silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles in three different fields. The silo exposure made international headlines, and demonstrated that China had started a significant nuclear expansion. The US Department of Defense now assesses that China will possess over 1000 warheads by 2030, a fourfold increase in a decade. Even though the United States and Russia will continue to possess significantly larger arsenals, there is no doubt that China’s buildup represents a turn away from its traditional approach of maintaining a small nuclear force.

There is less agreement about why China is expanding its arsenal. In my article, I argue that there is still little evidence to suggest to that the expansion represents a change in China’s nuclear strategy. Chinese leaders have traditionally thought of nuclear weapons as having two functions: Deterring nuclear attacks from others, and countering nuclear blackmail or coercion. The buildup could enable later shifts in strategy, but there are still few signs of Chinese leaders fundamentally rethinking the purposes nuclear weapons serve in their defense policy.

I further find that the main driver of China’s expansion is concerns about US capabilities such as missile defense and highly precise nuclear and conventional weapons. Chinese sources indicate that worries about US nuclear policy have increased in recent years. Many in China fear the combination of weapons that can target its nuclear forces, and defenses that can intercept any surviving Chinese missiles. In tandem, they argue, such capabilities pose a major threat to China’s nuclear deterrent.

To be clear, other factors may also have influenced China’s buildup. Some analysts point to prestige and status concerns as a possible explanation. Others have indicated that the purpose of the expansion is to create a stronger “shield” to enable conventional aggression against Taiwan, which is possible, but not directly discussed in Chinese sources. Nevertheless, my findings indicate that concern about the vulnerability of its arsenal is likely to be the main driver. In particular, the Donald Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review was seen as alarming in China and contributed to increasing worries about the future strategic stability.

Towards an arms race?

My findings have implications for the debates about US nuclear policy. There is increasing discussion in the United States about whether to respond to China’s buildup through a similar expansion and by deploying new weapons systems. In October, the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States published its final report. The commission recommended to prepare to upload some or all of the warheads currently held in reserve. It further stated that the United States should deploy additional theater nuclear weapons with variable yield (or so-called tactical nuclear weapons) to the Indo-Pacific region. Similarly, a study group convened by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) recently argued that “The United States should plan and prepare to deploy additional warheads and bombs from the reserve.”

Unfortunately, my article indicates that such responses are very likely to lead to major arms race pressures. For example, influential US experts have argued that the United States should attempt to maintain a so-called damage limitation capability – that is, the ability to destroy or intercept as many Chinese nuclear weapons as possible in the event of an all-out war. The problem of this approach, however, is that Chinese leaders are no longer willing to live with a vulnerable arsenal. China is very likely to respond if its leaders and experts believe the United States is attempting to maintain a damage limitation capability.

Similarly, if the United States deploys new tactical nuclear weapons in Asia, the likelihood of China developing such weapons may increase. As experts from the Federation of American Scientists highlight, there is still no evidence that China plans to field a new low-yield warhead. However, my article highlights that Chinese experts are debating whether there is a need for such weapons as a response option vis-à-vis the United States.

Different nuclear schools of thought

As other scholars have also highlighted, the competing readings of China’s nuclear intentions, and of how the United States should respond, is in no small part informed by different assumptions and theories about nuclear strategy. Scholars who believe the balance of terror is delicate – and that states have incentives to pursue superiority – are likely to see China’s expansion as alarming. These scholars, whose views also appears to be at least partly shared by U.S. officials, fear China might be opting for a first-strike capability. Moreover, they argue that the United States should attempt to maintain its superior position.

My research demonstrates, however, that fears of China opting for nuclear superiority and a first-strike capability are overblown. Instead, China’s expansion aligns with the so-called nuclear revolution theory. A key tenet of this school of thought it that states should strive for a secure second-strike capability, but that pursuit of superiority is meaningless. So far, China appears to be acting like a good nuclear revolutionary. If it continues to do so, an arms race may still be at hand, albeit one less intense than the Cold War race.

Read the article “The last atomic Waltz: China’s nuclear expansion and the persisting relevance of the theory of the nuclear revolution” here

Special Issue: Reclaiming the local in EU peacebuilding

kosovoContemporary Security Policy will publish a special issue on Reclaiming the local in EU peacebuilding edited by Filip Ejdus and Ana E. Juncos.

Since the early 2000s, the “local turn” has thoroughly transformed the field of peacebuilding. The EU policy discourse on peacebuilding has also aligned with this trend, with an increasing number of EU policy statements insisting on the importance of “the local.” However, most studies on EU peacebuilding still adopt a top-down approach and focus on institutions, capabilities, and decision-making at the EU level. This special issue contributes to the literature by focusing on bottom-up and local dynamics of EU peacebuilding.

Introduction

Reclaiming the local in EU peacebuilding: Effectiveness, ownership, and resistance
Filip Ejdus and Ana E. Juncos

Articles

Local ownership as international governmentality: Evidence from the EU mission in the Horn of Africa
Filip Ejdus

The interaction between local and international power in EU police reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Birte Gippert

Local contestation against European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
Ewa Mahr

EU security sector reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Reform or resist?
Ana E. Juncos

Local perceptions of the EU’s role in peacebuilding: The case of Palestinian security sector reform
Patrick Mueller and Yazid Zahda

Effective? Locally owned? Beyond the technocratic perspective on the European Union police mission for the Palestinian Territories
Filip Ejdus and Alaa Tartir

Conclusion

The limits of technocracy and local encounters: The European Union and peacebuilding
Roger Mac Ginty

Forum: Multinational Rapid Response

Military rapid response mechanisms are generally understood as troops that are on standby, ready to be deployed to a crisis within a short time frame. Yet, the overall track record of the existing multinational rapid response mechanisms within the European Union, the African Union, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains disappointing, and the United Nations does not even have a rapidly deployable capacity anymore. Meanwhile, despite that calls for the further development of these mechanisms are still being voiced politically, scholarly literature remains fragmented. This is problematic as many of the obstacles faced by these organizations are similar. This forum uniquely compares experiences from the four aforementioned organizations.

Forum: Multinational Rapid Response Mechanisms

Yf Reykers & John Karlsrud
Multinational rapid response mechanisms: Past promises and future prospects

Joachim A. Koops & Alexandra Novosseloff
United Nations rapid reaction mechanisms: Toward a global force on standby?

Jens Ringsmose & Sten Rynning
The NATO Response Force: A qualified failure no more?

Yf Reykers
EU Battlegroups: High costs, no benefits

Linda Darkwa
The African Standby Force: The African Union’s tool for the maintenance of peace and security

 

Special Issue: Targeted Killing and International Order

Obama_and_Biden_await_updates_on_bin_LadenContemporary Security Policy has published a special issue on The Transformation of Targeted Killing and International Order edited by Martin Senn and Jodok Troy.

Introduction

The transformation of targeted killing and international order
Martin Senn & Jodok Troy

Articles

Targeted killings: Drones, noncombatant immunity, and the politics of killing
Thomas Gregory

Not completely the new normal: How Human Rights Watch tried to suppress the targeted killing norm
Betcy Jose

Friction, not erosion: Assassination norms at the fault line between sovereignty and liberal values
Mathias Großklaus

The evolution of targeted killing practices: Autonomous weapons, future conflict, and the international order
Michael Carl Haas & Sophie-Charlotte Fischer

Conclusion

Targeted killing in international relations theory: Recursive politics of technology, law, and practice
Ian Hurd

Forum: African security

African security, particularly conflict-related political violence, is a key concern in international relations. This forum seeks to advance existing research agendas by addressing four key themes: domestic politics and peacekeeping; security sector reform programs; peace enforcement; and the protection of civilians. Each of the articles in this forum makes a case for analyzing African agency when it comes to African security.

dod-continues-central-african-republic-peacekeeping-supportForum: African security

Toni Haastrup & Hylke Dijkstra
New directions for African security

Malte Brosig
Rentier peacekeeping in neo-patrimonial systems: The examples of Burundi and Kenya

Nadine Ansorg
Security sector reform in Africa: Donor approaches versus local needs

Cedric de Coning
Peace enforcement in Africa: Doctrinal distinctions between the African Union and United Nations

Linnéa Gelot
Civilian protection in Africa: How the protection of civilians is being militarized by African policymakers and diplomats

APRIL 2017 ISSUE – TABLE OF CONTENTS

AnnouncementsCSP Cover

Changes to the editorial board

The 2017 Bernard Brodie Prize

Fighting with allies

Stephen Frühling and Andrew O’Neil
Nuclear weapons, the United States and alliances in Europe and Asia: Toward an institutional perspective

Debate: nuclear alliances and Donald Trump

Jeffrey W. Knopf
Security assurances and proliferation risks in the Trump administration

Van Jackson
Let’s make a (nuclear) deal: bargaining, credibility, and the third offset strategy

Alexander Lanoszka
Goodbye to all that? Institutionalist theory, U.S. alliances, and Donald Trump

Stephen Frühling and Andrew O’Neil
Nuclear weapons and alliance institutions in the era of President Trump

Old wine, great bottles

Jeffrey Michaels and Heather Williams
The nuclear education of Donald J. Trump

Security dilemmas

Frank O’Donnell
Reconsidering minimum deterrence in South Asia: Indian responses to Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons

Forum: African security

Toni Haastrup and Hylke Dijkstra
New directions for African security

Malte Brosig
Rentier peacekeeping in neo-patrimonial systems: the examples of Burundi and Kenya

Nadine Ansorg
Security sector reform in Africa: donor approaches versus local needs

Cedric de Coning
Peace enforcement in Africa: doctrinal distinctions between the African Union and United Nations

Linnéa Gelot
Civilian protection in Africa: How the protection of civilians is being militarized by African policymakers and diplomats

 

Nuclear weapons, U.S. alliances, and Donald Trump

trump_natoIn September 2016, Stephan Frühling and Andrew O’Neil submitted a manuscript to Contemporary Security Policy entitled “Nuclear weapons, the United States and alliances in Europe and Asia: Toward an institutional perspective” (see also shorter blog post). This article argues that nuclear bargaining between the United States and allies in Europe and Asia cannot be seen independent from the wider institutional context in which alliance politics plays out. As such the article challenges the prism of “extended nuclear deterrence,” which provides too much a US-centred approach.

On the very morning of 9 November that the proofs of the Frühling/O’Neil article arrived, we woke up to the surprise news of a Donald Trump presidency. This immediately raised the important academic and policy question whether the findings of Frühling and O’Neil, on the importance of the institutional context, would continue to have relevance. After all, Trump had proposed during the campaign a “transactional approach” to foreign policy suggesting that European allies would only benefit from U.S. protection if they pay up, and that Asian allies might need to develop their own nuclear weapons. To assess the impact of the Trump presidency, and to foster academic debate, Jeffrey Knopf, Van Jackson, and Alexander Lanoszka have written responses to the Frühling/O’Neil article. Frühling and O’Neil have written a conclusion.

Debate: nuclear weapons, U.S. alliances, and Donald Trump

Stephan Frühling & Andrew O’Neil
Nuclear weapons, the United States and alliances in Europe and Asia: Toward an institutional perspective

Jeffrey Knopf
Security assurances and proliferation risks in the Trump administration

Van Jackson
Let’s make a (nuclear) deal: bargaining, credibility, and the third offset strategy

Alexander Lanoszka
Goodbye to all that? Institutionalist theory, U.S. alliances, and Donald Trump

Stephan Frühling & Andrew O’Neil
Nuclear weapons and alliance institutions in the era of President Trump

Forum: The EU Global Strategy

15096259903_18b0f2d735_b

Contemporary Security Policy seeks to publish research on issues of contemporary importance, that have a security implication, and are relevant in terms of policy. The recent European Union Global Strategy (EUGS), presented by the EU High Representative Federica Mogherini to the European Council in June 2016, ticks all these boxes. For Europe–encircled by security crises–it is difficult to think of something more important than collective action with the aim of weathering the storm. This is precisely what the EUGS is supposed to be about. Defining common ends and identifying means to achieve them.

So what do we make of the EUGS? What does the EUGS tell us about the current role of the European Union (EU) in global affairs? And how will the withdrawal of the UK from the EU affect foreign and security policy? The seven articles in this forum reflect on these questions from different perspectives. Rather than dissecting the EUGS paragraph-by-paragraph, the authors use the EUGS as an opportunity to reflect on EU foreign and security policy. Without giving any of their conclusions away, the authors are reasonably positive about the EUGS, but they worry whether the EU can deliver in an increasingly ‘connected, contested and complex world’.

Forum: The EU Global Strategy

Hylke Dijkstra
Introduction: One-and-a-half Cheers for the EU Global Strategy

Maria Mälksoo
From the ESS to the EU Global Strategy: external policy, internal purpose

Jolyon Howorth
EU Global Strategy in a Changing World: Brussels’ Approach to the Emerging Powers

Mai’a Davis Cross
The EU Global Strategy and diplomacy

Wolfgang Wagner and Rosanne Anholt
Resilience as the EU Global Strategy’s new leitmotif: Pragmatic, problematic or promising?

Sven Biscop
All or Nothing? The EU Global Strategy and Defence Policy after the Brexit

Michael E. Smith
Implementing the Global Strategy Where It Matters Most: The EU’s Credibility Deficit and the European Neighbourhood

Nathalie Tocci
The Making of the EU Global Strategy

December 2016 issue – Table of Contents

csp-coverIncoherent Policies

Florian Böller and Sebastian Werle
Fencing the bear? Explaining US foreign policy towards Russian interventions

Choosing Sides

Ogen S. Goldman and Uriel Abulof
Democracy for the rescue—of dictators? The role of regime type in civil war interventions

Forum: the EU Global Strategy

Hylke Dijkstra
Introduction: One-and-a-half Cheers for the EU Global Strategy

Maria Mälksoo
From the ESS to the EU Global Strategy: external policy, internal purpose

Jolyon Howorth
EU Global Strategy in a Changing World: Brussels’ Approach to the Emerging Powers

Mai’a Davis Cross
The EU Global Strategy and diplomacy

Wolfgang Wagner and Rosanne Anholt
Resilience as the EU Global Strategy’s new leitmotif: Pragmatic, problematic or promising?

Sven Biscop
All or Nothing? The EU Global Strategy and Defence Policy after the Brexit

Michael E. Smith
Implementing the Global Strategy Where It Matters Most: The EU’s Credibility Deficit and the European Neighbourhood

Nathalie Tocci
The Making of the EU Global Strategy

Books Reviews

Mario E. Carranza
The case for U.S. nuclear weapons in the 21st century

Dinshaw Mistry
Deadly impasse: Indo-Pakistani relations at the dawn of a new century

The coming multi-order world

novus_ordos
US Dollar Bill: Novus Ordos Seclorum

Trine Flockhart from the University of Kent, United Kingdom has just published an article entitled “The coming multi-order world”.

Abstract: The article shows that the current international system is changing towards a completely new form of international system, conceptualized as a multi-order system. The suggestion for a multi-order world stands in contrast to three current narratives about the future global order expressed through a multipolar narrative; a multi-partner narrative and a multi-culture narrative. The article demonstrates that although each narrative points to a plausible future, neither fully captures what lies ahead. Using English School concepts such as order, international society, international system and primary and secondary institutions, the article reveals a conception of the coming international system as a system consisting of several different ‘orders’ (or international societies) nested within an overall international system. In the coming ‘multi-order world’, the liberal order will continue, and may even be strengthened internally, but its global reach will be a thing of the past. Moreover, the challenge in a multi-order world will be to forge new forms of relationships between composite and diverse actors across complex lines of division and convergence. Scholars and policy-makers should note that the coming multi-order world will be radically different, requiring new thinking and new institutions and the acceptance of diversity in both power and principle.

Access the full article here (Open Access).